A data set of 560 credit files from Thai commercial banks is compiled. Loan granting follows reasonable patterns as a standard set of variables explains much of the variance in interest rate spread. A second finding is the expected higher importance of "relationship banking". Third, risk is rather controlled via credit availability than via pricing. Fourth, the ex post information about default reveals that banks could have made better use of available information. Overall, the main problem was not careless lending to firms with which the banks had close relationships, but clearly one of fully recognizing the risk factors.
Introduction
Whenever a financial crisis in an emerging economy occurs, the local financial institutions seem to be among the natural suspects. Neither their sophistication in risk management nor the ability of national authorities to supervise banks meets the present world standards. It is thus often a logical conclusion to blame "bad banking" (Krugman, 1998) for the many financial disasters that happen, and to demand strong policy changes. However, this logic assumes rather than proves a causal link between bad domestic financial institutions and financial crises. Of course, banks in emerging economies are "weak" in comparison to banks in industrialized countries; but this is trivial, as the development process incorporates institution building. Weakness in this sense does not necessarily mean ineffectiveness. To discover more about the rationale of bank behavior, we conducted an in-depth case study of the lending decisions of Thai commercial banks before the Asian crisis, based on their internal credit files. The evidence clearly indicates a pattern of behavior for the core of Thailand's financial system that is reasonable and gradually different from results for industrialized countries. The prominent role of close relations between bank and borrower is not identified as the major problem, but inferior use of information about risky borrowers is.
The unexpected outbreak of the Asian crisis, and the fact that there was no historical precedent for the nature of its progress, initiated a wealth of new research into the functioning of financial systems in emerging economies. 1 This complements on-going debates on liberalization and the growth effects of financial development. 2 The nature of the Thai banking system has been of particular interest in this debate as the crisis started in Thailand, so that contagion can be ruled out as an explanatory variable (see Baig and Goldfajn, 1999) . Moreover, the bad banking hypothesis seems to be appropriate, as financial sector problems partially preceded the overall economic crisis in Thailand (see e.g. Warr, 1999 , Rajan, 2001 ).
The objective of this study is to explain the lending process before the crisis from the banks' perspective, as this piece of evidence has been missing until now.
Therefore, we analyze Thai commercial banks under the theoretical perspective of relationship lending (Boot, 2000) , as it is precisely these close relations between banks and their customers that seem to characterize lending in emerging economies.
For this purpose, a new data set was compiled in 2000/01, consisting of 560 credit files sourced from the majority of Thai commercial banks. These banks form the core of Thailand's financial system, accounting for around 60% of total assets; another 20% are represented by so-called finance companies, and the remaining 20% are held by specialized state banks and foreign banks. The data cover the period 1992 to 1996.
The only other similar kind of paper focusing on an emerging economy of which we are aware (La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa, 2003) examines related lending in Mexico. The result is striking, as the information gathered clearly indicates that related lending in Mexico is accompanied by more favorable credit terms for the borrowers and worse repayment for the lending bank than non-related lending: related lending is thus a way of redistributing wealth from the bank to related companies.
It is interesting to note in this respect that before the Asian crisis, Thailand's banks were regarded as a positive element in the economy. In the World Bank's East Asian Miracle Study (World Bank, 1993) , Thailand was among the countries classified as resource-efficient. Consequently, total factor productivity is comparatively high in empirical studies, and it would be difficult to explain that this outcome is real despite a large inefficient banking sector (Menkhoff, 2000) . So what are the systematic factors that explain the way in which Thai banks granted credit? We ask whether, and in which way, risk has been considered and priced, and whether, and in which way, relations between bank and borrower have influenced lending.
We find that stable structures which fit well into the existing literature from industrialized countries can be recognized. For the developing economy, however, as expected from theoretical considerations, relationship indicators have relatively greater importance in explaining the interest rate spread than risk variables. Moreover, credit availability is reduced for more risky borrowers, whereas risk proxies do not seem to influence spread. In addition, the information on a later default of extended loans is used. We conjecture that banks did not apply possible knowledge on later default in their decisions on pricing and availability of loans. Finally, when using default as the dependent variable, relation proxies indicate an ambivalent effect for Thai commercial banks, as close customers did not generally receive too risky credit, but large (and tentatively related) customers did. Moreover, risk proxies help to explain default and thus have obviously not been fully exploited beforehand, indicating limited efficiency in Thai commercial banks' lending practice.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a detailed description and analysis of the data used. The systematic examination on the ex ante nature of lending in Thailand is presented in Section 3. The information from the de-5 fault variable is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a view on possible objections to the results of this research.
2
The data
Data compilation
The greatest hurdle in conducting this study was to receive the cooperation of Thai banks in allowing researchers to study their credit files. It seems to be obvious that these banks had no direct interest in such work and that -due to the history of the banking system -they feared outcomes that could attach blame to them. In getting the support of banks, three factors were helpful: first, the passing of time helped to heal wounds as many responsible persons changed positions, and procedures were upgraded so that if the outcome might blame anything, it would just be "history"
and would be unlikely to single out present practices. Second, all participants were promised strict confidentiality so that nobody could identify unprofessional practices and no bank or person can be singled out. Third, the study is a pure research project which is not intended to gain any private information advantage but aims to improve knowledge. It thus produces a public benefit which was honored by a supporting letter from the Thai Ministry of Finance, which is involved in banking supervision.
Starting in August 2000 we approached all 15 Thai commercial banks that existed before the crisis or their successors in case of closures or mergers. Nine banks finally agreed to cooperate and are thus included in our sample. As their number is so limited and we promised confidentiality, we cannot say much about their participation except that it is quite representative for the size structure of the banking sector.
Regarding the selection of credit files, there is the problem of an uncontrollable selection bias which could distort our sample and produce misleading results. In par-ticular it is to be expected that banks want to present themselves in a favorable light, although the personal incentive was probably low due to changing responsibilities and confidentiality should reduce the incentive for strategic file selection. So, we tried to get cooperation from as many banks as possible to minimize the impact from distorted selection in a certain bank. Within the banks, we asked for a randomized sample. As the depository of files often follows some criteria, in these cases we decided on a diversified selection. In some cases the banks presented lists of customers revealing size and industry, so we could choose the files (preferring the critical industries construction and real estate).
Between September 2000 and March 2001, the nine participating banks were each visited for about two to three weeks. Between 35 and 85 credit files of the predetermined five-year period from 1992 to 1996 were analyzed in each bank. In all 560 cases, we focus only on a single loan grant. For each loan, we personally extracted the information from the credit file or supervised the bank employee doing so to ensure that the information was compiled in a comparable way.
Data representativeness
It is moreover important to test whether the data in our study represent the loans made by Thai commercial banks in a reasonable manner. There are basically three ways to find out whether the credit files compiled largely represent the total population. First, the average firm size may be analyzed, second the industry structure of loans can be compared with the market, and third, the share of nonperforming loans (NPLs) can be compared with that for all commercial banks (see Menkhoff and Suwanaporn, 2003 , for more details).
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The minimum firm asset size realized in the sample of about one million Baht equals roughly 40,000 USD at the historical exchange rate. The maximum size of about 90 billion Baht equates to around 3.6 billion USD. This indicates what the median value of 10 million USD confirms: the sample does not represent the total economy, but rather the medium and larger sized segments of Thailand's economy. The reason is that the credit files stem from the headquarter offices, which handle all larger loan cases, whereas the really small loans may be decided at decentralized branches.
The industry structure of loans in the sample also shows some deviation from the total population as it is classified by the central bank. The by far largest recipient of loans in the country, manufacturing industry, is also the largest in our sample with a 44% share. The sample, moreover, consciously over-represents "real estate" and "construction", which are regarded as industries deeply involved in the crisis, and necessarily under-represents all other industries with the exception of services.
Finally, non-performing loans have a share of 45.9% in the sample. This is in the same dimension as published figures, which at the height of the crisis mentioned a figure of slightly more than 50%. Although there are large differences between the NPL shares of the nine banks, the overall figure signals useful information.
Overall, the data received represent only firms with bank loans and they are not strictly representative of commercial banks. Loans refer to medium and large size firms, industries are gradually over-or under-represented and the NPL share may be rather low. However, bearing this in mind, the data are not misleading and thus appear to be useful for our research.
Description of variables
Due to the purpose of the study, there are two dependent variables, the interest rate spread (IRS) and credit availability. The IRS is measured as the difference between the interest rate charged and the minimum overdraft rate. The latter is the reference rate charged to first class customers for overdraft credit and lines of credit.
Credit availability is more difficult to grasp. Petersen and Rajan (1994, p.18 ) advise against taking the actual debt ratio as this may be an ambivalent figure, either reflecting credit demand -which is not of interest here (good firms may not need credit) -or credit supply as seen from the bank's point of view (the bank possibly rations a firm). We therefore rely on the "bank credit ratio" (BCR) which is the line of credit (L/C) divided by the sum of L/C plus liabilities. Its central advantage is that the L/C includes available future credit because the L/C is usually not fully used. The larger the BCR the greater the probability of there being unused L/C, indicating good credit availability. This is, of course, still a crude measure of credit availability, as there is no information about the extent to which the L/C has already been used. Moreover, the L/C is also influenced by credit demand and supply factors similar to the actual credit used. The advantage of using the BCR against the debt ratio, however, is the -admittedly imprecise -indication about available credit in the future.
Regarding the independent variables, Table 1 presents the full list and an exact description of variables used. The next group after the dependent variables in the list is three variables that aim to directly capture the riskiness of loans. Higher risk is expected to be indicated by a higher liability-to-asset ratio (or leverage), by a lower current ratio and a lower interest coverage ratio. The following group of variables in Ta Finally, and consistent with other studies, the variable asset size is left-steep distributed with extremely few large firms and has thus been transformed into logarithmic values. The same transformation was chosen for the variables number of large firms.
Characteristics of borrowing firms and loans
The last part in this Section 2 gives average values of variables and their deviation by way of the relation of these variables with the asset size of borrowing firms (see also Petersen and Rajan, 1994) . Firm-related variables are shown in Table 2 .
The smallest 10% of firms covered has assets below 22.1 million Baht, i.e. slightly less than 1 million USD. The largest firms have assets of more than 2,947 million Baht, i.e. roughly 118 million USD.
Means of the variables develop with percentiles of increasing asset size. Size related figures, such as age, equity and liabilities go clearly upwards. The behavior of the three risk proxies may therefore be more interesting: the liability-to-asset ratio increases slightly, the current ratio shows a hump-shaped pattern, whereas the interest coverage ratio clearly goes down, with the exception of the smallest firms. This means that larger firms tend to be identified as unanimously more risky than medium sized firms and also as somewhat more risky than small firms.
The characteristics of loans depending on the asset size of borrowing firms is presented in Table 3 In summary, Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence that the data set includes economically rational information and that this structure is similar to well-known structures from mature markets. Empirical examinations first analyze bank lending behavior using ex ante information (Section 3), and then using ex post information in addition (Section 4).
Results based on ex ante information
The frequently expressed skeptical view on the quality of Thailand's financial institutions assumes that risk had not been priced appropriately and that close relations between banks and borrowers had instead dominated lending decisions. This section addresses these concerns by applying the standard empirical technique of the relationship banking literature to the case of Thailand.
The general pricing of loans
The literature on loan pricing in mature markets found that risk factors play a surprisingly small role, that relationship sometimes matters and that the size of a firm is always important. 3 In the case of an emerging market, such as Thailand, we would expect that the credit granting technology is even less developed and information from balance sheet data is more opaque so that risk factors do not have a recognizable influence on loan pricing:
H1
The pricing of loans is not systematically influenced by risk factors of the borrowing firm.
Regarding relationship lending, the institutional environment of an emerging economy seems favorable to its widespread use. Relationship building between lender and borrower can be understood as an institution to partially overcome the incomplete and asymmetric information between the parties involved. The more perfect markets are and the better the quality of information is, the more contracts are expected to be reliable and enforceable and the smaller is any possible advantage from relationship lending. We can thus expect that Thailand is a case where relationship lending may play a prominent role, in particular for smaller firms.
What may be less clear is the influence of relationship on the pricing of loans.
Arguing that a close bank has intimate private knowledge of the borrowing firm and can thus assess risks more precisely would justify the realization of lower interest rates. One can, however, also argue that the close bank is in a strong bargaining position as it is the main provider of credit and as its potential withdrawal of credit would provide a strong negative signal to other lenders. In this sense, a firm is to some degree "caught" in the particular relation with a close bank. In the situation of an emerging economy both arguments seem to be of particular relevance: information asymmetry is very important and would lead to a negative correlation between interest rate spread and the incidence of relationship lending. However, competition between banks is also rather lower than in mature markets and would thus allow a close bank to more easily exploit its position. This would lead to a positive correlation between spread and relationship lending. Due to the ex ante unclear sign of the relationship variables we focus on the strength of relationship lending:
H2 Relationship indicators are important in explaining bank lending, rather more so than in mature markets. sions where variables are included which have been previously identified as important in such examinations. To consider conflicting aspects, several specifications of the following general form are used:
Interest rate spread = β 0 + β 1 risk proxies + β 2 relationship indicators + β 3 indirect risk variables + β 4 bank dummies + β 5 year dummies + β 6 industry dummies + ε Specification (1) in Table 4 proceeds as suggested by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and serves as the benchmark. In order to avoid possibly distorting influences from extreme values of the risk variables (see Section 2.3), Petersen and Rajan suggest setting a negative value of the interest rate coverage ratio to zero as well as excluding the most extreme 5% of cases from the three risk variables. The disadvantage of this procedure is that the case number goes down to 416.
In this benchmark specification, the signs of almost all variables are as expected from theory. Neglecting the constant term, it is unfortunately the first risk proxy -the liability-to-asset ratio -which presents an unexpected negative sign, indicating that firms with higher leverage would receive cheaper money. 4 The other two risk proxies have the expected negative sign. Turning to the group of relationship variables, these show negative signs too, indicating that related loans are cheaper (see e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995) . The lower spread resulting from more lending banks indicates competition in the industry. The sign of the asset size variable is as theoretically expected. Collateral has a positive sign, indicating that collateral could only partially cover the high risk, collateralized loans being still riskier than others.
Finally, the age variable is expected to show a negative sign, but obviously the effect is already included in other correlated variables, such as size, and the remaining effect is close to zero.
The behavior of the dummies -not shown here -is as follows: the large and different coefficients for the nine banks are remarkable, indicating either quite different borrowers or strategies. The year dummies have low coefficients, indicating slightly growing spreads over time. This time trend may be caused by two effects:
first, the economic conditions have become rather worse over time and second, some disintermediation has happened (see Menkhoff, 2000) which may not be fully captured by the other variables. Finally, the coefficients of the industry dummies are of small size and often point to the expected direction, such as higher spreads for construction and real estate and lower spreads for (the preferred industry of) agriculture or banks. Overall, the signs of the coefficients are rational.
Turning to the explanatory strength of the variables, four coefficients are statistically significant, apart from the constant term and bank dummies. First of all, the asset size variable is dominant. The risk proxies are not statistically significant in contrast to the relationship indicators. Among the latter, two of them are significant, i.e. the house bank variable as well as the number of banks lending to the firm. The fourth significant variable -not shown here -is for the construction industry, which makes sense for this highly cyclical and leveraged business.
In order to check the robustness of findings we examine several modifications.
Specification (2) aims at better capturing the non-linear firm size effect. Taking account of the increasing interest rate spread for the ten per cent largest firms (see Ta- ble 3), we add a second size term to the benchmark specification which effectively models this non-linearity. The result is, indeed, an improvement towards theoretical expectations as the overall fit becomes better, the collateral coefficient becomes significant and the "wrong" sign of the liability-to-asset ratio is now of negligible size. In another examination we follow Berger and Udell (1995) and split the total sample into two subsamples of the same size each, expecting that the small firm sample has a higher influence of relationship variables. Specification (3) shows respective findings for the smaller firms, which has the expected higher overall fit than the regression of larger firms (not presented here). Coefficients do not change in comparison with the benchmark -except for the liability-to-asset ratio becoming positive -but significance of coefficients goes down, probably due to the smaller sample size. The importance of relationship banking in Thailand becomes very obvious from the fact that in the larger firms sample only the variable relation duration has a significant coefficient. In a related exercise, specification (4) picks up the influence from house banks on the liability-to-asset ratio by integrating both variables into a new interactive variable. It is found that the unexpected sign of this risk proxy is generated by house banks only, whereas non-house banks set higher loan rates to firms with higher leverage. Finally, to check whether results depend on the sample size, various specifications -e.g. with less restrictions on the risk variables -have been run without major changes (see Menkhoff and Suwanaporn, 2003) .
Assessing these findings, hypothesis 1 is supported in the sense that risk factors are not statistically significant. However, considering that these factors are usually not significant in mature markets either and that they are by and large "correctly" signed in our sample, the result may be rather surprising for a developing market.
Hypothesis 2, by contrast, is strongly supported by findings as relationship variables are always significant. It may be remarkable, too, that a house bank relationship goes along with lower interest rate spread which rather points towards a non-exploiting role of house banks. In similar settings for the USA (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) or Germany (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998) a significant effect cannot be identified. Having addressed pricing, we now turn to the question of availability of loans.
The availability of loans
The theory of credit rationing links rationing to informational asymmetry in credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . As asymmetric information between lender and borrower is even more pronounced in emerging markets, one may expect reduced possibilities for discriminative pricing by Thai commercial banks. Instead, banks may then rely more on rationing, i.e. influencing credit availability according to the perceived riskiness of borrowers. In this credit rationing regime, relationship may matter, as indicated by studies from mature markets: a good relation improves credit availability.
H3
Risk proxies are more important in explaining credit availability than in explaining the spread.
The set of explanatory variables is thus regressed on the "bank credit ratio"-variable which aims to capture credit availability. The result presented as specification (1) in Table 5 shows, indeed, a reassuring result: as can be expected from theoretical reasoning, the sign of coefficients is mostly opposite to the pricing regressions -meaning that banks react to the same set of variables with higher spreads and/or relatively lower amount of loans. In addition, hypothesis 3 receives clear support as two of the three risk proxies show the expected sign and the liability-to-asset ratio is now even statistically significant and of high economic importance. This result -in combination with the earlier findings on loan pricing -suggests that Thai commercial banks address risk more by limiting the amount of credit than by increasing the price of loans, thus supporting hypothesis 3.
Further results seem noteworthy: a house bank relation improves credit availability, as identified by earlier literature on mature markets (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , Machauer and Weber, 1998 , Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001 ). The asset size variable does not seem to capture the riskiness of a firm but rather reveals a limitation of our credit availability indicator as large firms rely much less on bank credit and thus also need less open credit lines (see also Table 3 ). Moreover, the differences between the nine banks are much smaller regarding the provision of credit availability than regarding their loan pricing (not reported). This may be interpreted as a further indication that the systematic component of lending behavior of Thai commercial banks can be better understood by looking at the relative volume of loans rather than at prices.
Further regressions indicate the importance of credit availability for the lending decisions of Thai commercial banks. Splitting the sample into loans to small and large firms does not influence the outcome much, and particularly not so drastically as it did for interest rate spreads. The only new significant result for small firms is the detrimental influence from many lending banks, possibly signaling some problems in attracting large amounts when there are "too many" banks necessary (see specification 2). Regarding large firms, another variable becomes significant, i.e. the positive influence of relation duration (see specification 3), a result already known from the pricing regression. This may indicate that a longer lending relationship increases credit availability because the bank learns more about the borrower, but also increases the borrower's lock-in or the bank's bargaining power to charge higher loan prices. However, the variable age shows a statistically negative sign, which we inter-pret as indication of other financing alternatives of established large firms. Finally, specification (4) informs about determinants of house bank relations. In accordance with earlier findings, the variable relation duration does pick up the relationship effect from the missing house bank variable. Somewhat puzzling may be the negative sign of the age variable which is -by contrast -positive for non-house bank relations (not reported). A plausible interpretation may be that the age variable here does not reflect risk but rather strong commitment of house banks in young firms' financing as both variables are significantly correlated (not reported).
Summarizing Section 3.2, credit rationing and our empirical measure of credit availability seems to be a fruitful concept in understanding bank lending in an emerging market. The next Section 4 repeats the basic research questions from Section 3, but exploiting the advantage from ex post information.
Results based on ex post information
This section tests the rationale of bank lending from an ex post perspective, as it relies on information that was not available at the time of decision making. This additional information is the default variable, i.e. the information whether the loan has turned into a non-performing loan between loan granting in 1992-96 and data compilation in 2000/01. Although this information is hypothetical for decision making, insights can be expected from this information that is rare in the literature.
Examination of the default variable starts by presenting its correlations with other variables of interest. Column (1) in Table 6 shows that two out of three risk variables are significantly related to default and that all of them have the expected sign. This is remarkable as it reveals the potential usefulness of risk proxies to fore-cast later default. Moreover, size predicts -contrary to conventional wisdom -later default as well as a younger age of firms and shorter relation duration.
As later default seems to be systematically related to a comparatively worse situation of borrowing firms one may assume that banks could have anticipated this fact in their risk management, either by pricing or by rationing their loans respectively. If banks had used information on the riskiness of borrowers beyond the determinants identified so far, the inclusion of the default variable in earlier approaches might have improved the regressions. A significant default variable would then reveal the use of additional information.
H4
The inclusion of the default variable significantly helps to explain the interest rate spread and the degree of credit availability.
Thus, the benchmark regressions are taken as the basis, i.e. specification (1) from Table 4 for pricing, and specification (1) from Table 5 for credit availability. Results of enlarging the set of independent variables in both regressions are presented as specifications (2) and (3) of Table 6 .
The pricing regression, i.e. specification (2), reveals an unexpected result as the default variable has a very small and insignificant coefficient. As the explanatory power of the other variables is virtually unchanged, it can be concluded that information expressed by the default variable was not used in any way at the time of decision making. Hypothesis 4 is therefore -regarding pricing -not consistent with the data. A consequence is that banks probably did not possess hidden knowledge about riskiness of loans beyond the risk measures applied. However, this might be less relevant as credit rationing appears anyway to be more important.
Specification (3) in Table 6 indeed confirms hypothesis 4 as the default variable is statistically highly significant. The interesting point, however, is the sign of the de-fault variable, indicating that those firms which had more generous credit availability tended to default. When splitting the total sample into groups, this relation holds for large firms only. This signals some malfunctioning of bank lending, possibly some "policy influence", at least at first glance. The standardized coefficient of the default term, however, is less than half of the risk coefficients taken together (not shown here). Moreover, causality may be unclear, as e.g. Machauer and Weber (1998) find a higher share of "credit line to asset" for more risky firms, which will default easily in a crisis. This argument of reverse causality may be further sharpened, considering the credit crunch in Thailand's early post-crisis years in which credit-dependent firms were hardest hit (see Agénor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister, 2000) . The financial structure of firms is then the reason for default, in particular when the economic crisis is complemented by a banking crisis. To further examine this issue, it would be interesting to understand whether non-performing loans -which should have been identified ex ante as entailing higher risk -have more to do with risk proxies or relation indicators.
The general expectation regarding these variables follows from the institutional environment in a developing country. First, lower development can be interpreted as a weaker ability to extract information from available data, and thus to be revealed by an explanatory power of the risk variables. Second, relationship banking may be gradually ineffective and then show up in explanatory power of relationship variables for later default.
H5
The later default of borrowing firms can be explained by risk variables as well as by relationship variables.
Due to the 1-0-nature of the default variable, probit regressions are used here.
The respective benchmark regression is shown as specification (1) in Table 7 . Two of the three risk proxies have the expected sign, the current ratio is statistically highly significant and the interest coverage ratio is almost significant (at 11%). The case of relationship proxies is somewhat different as none of them are statistically significant.
In particular, house bank relations, as well as operating with fewer lending banks, tend to be related with lower rather than higher default probability. In this specification, larger assets and younger firm age are also positively related with default, whereas loans granted in the year 1992 (not reported) are negatively related. These results seem reasonable, with the unexpected exception that larger firms default more easily, and strongly support hypothesis 5.
This raises the question as to which influences may be hidden in the asset variable. Splitting the sample into small and large firms shows no contradiction between both regressions -presented as specifications (2) and (3) respectively -but different importance in determinants. The asset factor is a particular problem of large firms, confirming the above notion that there may be a weakness in the Thai banking system. As it is only for house banks where firm size becomes significant (not reported), this indicates that there might be influences on credit granting beyond economic rationale for the group of large and close firms in the sense of La Porta, López-deSilanes and Zamarripa (2003) . Another finding seems noteworthy, i.e. the opposite signs for the liability-to-asset ratio. The theoretically unexpected negative sign in specification (1) is obviously driven by small firm financing where it may represent rather a positive signal from already existing external financial sources.
In another effort to better understand the influence of the asset variable, specification (4) distinguishes the effect of higher credit volume from asset size. Both variables are highly correlated and therefore neglected in other regressions, but their joint inclusion could be informative here. The credit volume variable has a positive and highly significant coefficient, whereas the asset variable loses significance.
Three more changes towards significance can be recognized: in the house bank variable, the interest coverage ratio and the liability-to-asset ratio (this latter variable for small firms only, see above). These changes indicate that a high credit volume is rather more important than being a large firm for subsequent default, a finding that is consistent with the above-mentioned financial structure argument of weak creditdependent firms. The positive impact of a house bank on non-default may be caused by better understanding of the firm and/or by better credit availability for the firm.
In summary, the analysis of the default variable shows that Thai commercial banks do not seem to have used hitherto unidentified knowledge when pricing loans.
There is an unwanted influence, however, on credit availability for large firms. This weakness lives up when explaining default. An even greater problem is obviously unused information in direct and to some degree in indirect risk variables. The shortcoming in Thai commercial banks' lending decisions was thus easy lending to large, close customers, and even more generally an underutilization of information on the riskiness of borrowers.
Concluding comments
This research directly analyzes the behavior of local banks in an emerging market from several hundred credit files of Thai commercial banks. The findings show that the available risk variables are not important in pricing loans, a result that is similar to that found in mature markets. The higher weight of relationship in decision making -when compared to mature markets -is theoretically expected. Also, the importance of credit availability as a preferred instrument for controlling risk is sensible in more opaque financial markets. However, Thai commercial banks did not op-erate without problems. The analysis of ex post default cases shows that there is an element of too generous credit granting to related large firms. Moreover and quite generally, available risk information could have been used better to restrict default.
Both, elements of negative related lending as well as underutilization of information may not be unexpected for an emerging market. Given the dominating claim of "bad banking" and "related lending", however, the unimportant or -depending on the specification -stabilizing role of relationship in default regressions is more surprising.
Therefore, Thai commercial banks' lending rationale does not seem to be too different from banks in industrialized economies. Thai banks' main shortcoming is quite conventional, as they fail to fully recognize risk factors.
Several general lessons seem to emerge for the understanding of bank lending in developing countries, although more work appears to be warranted: First, emerging markets are different from mature markets as relationship lending and credit rationing tend to play a larger role. Second, this difference may be functional as it reflects the institutional environment, just as some form of financial repression may be useful under certain circumstances (see Demetriades and Luintel, 2001 ). Third, however, downsides of a strong relationship system can be recognized in the Thai case, despite its overall effectiveness. This teaches one to be aware of the functionality of institutions, a lesson related to the often country-specific impact of financial development on growth (De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995 , Demetriades and Hussein, 1996 , Luintel and Khan, 1999 . Finally, the functioning of a developing banking market can be clearly improved. Even the notoriously unreliable balance sheets in Thailand provided useful information on later default, information that was not fully used by domestic banks. It is thus most important to upgrade financial technology in accordance with the institutional possibilities (World Bank, 2001) . Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level (**: 5 percent level, *: 10 percent)
The table presents OLS regressions with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Negative values of the interest coverage ratio are set to zero and the most extreme 5% cases of each risk proxy are excluded. In specification (2) the variable Ln (assets) * Ln (assets) is added. Specification (3) refers to small firms only and in specification (4) house bank status is interactively linked to the liabilityto-asset ratio. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level (**: 5 percent level, *:10 percent)
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